I.

Introduction
Usually a fictional character is protected by copyright law within the context of the work

in which the character appears. In these cases infringement is found if there is access to the
copyrighted work and there is substantial similarity between the copyrighted work and the
allegedly infringing work.1 Access is usually easy to prove if the original work is widely
available. Substantial similarity, however, is much more difficult to determine. One limiting
principle is that copyright protection extends only to the expression of an idea and not to the idea
itself.2
In determining whether there is substantial similarity between the expression of ideas
courts have sometimes used the “extrinsic” test where the plot, characters, setting, dialogue and
other details of the two works are compared.3 Other times courts have turned to a more
“intrinsic” test where “[t]he two works involved…[are] considered and tested, not hypercritically
or with meticulous scrutiny, but by the observations and impressions of the average reasonable
reader and spectator.”4 Another test, articulated by Judge Hand, is the abstraction test where
each work can be made more and more general as details are left out so that there will be “a point
in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright
could prevent the use of his ‘ideas’, to which, apart from their expression, his property is never
extended.”5
As is evident by the number of different tests used it is often difficult to determine if an
allegedly infringing work has taken so much of the expression of the original to satisfy the
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“substantially similar” standard of copyright infringement. The problem is further complicated
when we consider whether literary characters deserve separate and independent protection.
The problem of separate protection for literary characters arises when the character is
removed from the original work so that the character is now leading a new and independent life
completely separate from the original work. Characters that are capable of leading independent
lives are especially memorable characters that stay in a reader’s imagination long after the
original storyline is forgotten. What happens if somebody wants to write a new adventure for
Superman, Tarzan, or Sherlock Holmes? Now that the character is separated from his original
copyrighted work it becomes difficult to decide what sort of legal protection he deserves.
A few years ago the topic of character protection arose when the estate of Vladimir
Nabakov sued Pia Pera, the author of Lo’s Diary.6 Lo’s Diary makes extensive use of Lolita and
Humbert, the main characters of Nabakov’s 1955 copyrighted novel, Lolita.7 Lo’s Diary tells the
story from Lolita’s point of view.8 The parties ultimately settled, presumably in part because of
the uncertainty regarding protection of literary characters. Lo’s Diary is not the only work where
authors have borrowed characters from other novels. A novel by Valerie Martin retells the story
of Dr. Jeckyl and Mr. Hyde from the point of view of Mary Reilly, the doctor’s maid.9 Tom
Stoppard used two minor characters from Shakespeare’s Hamlet when he wrote Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern are Dead.10 A novel, Wild Sargasso Sea, was written about Mrs. Rochester, the
mysterious crazed first wife from the novel Jane Eyre.11
On one hand, characters could be copyrighted separately so that the same character or a
substantially similar character cannot appear in a new work without the author’s permission.
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This approach will clearly limit the building blocks or raw material that other authors have to
work with in a way that would likely hinder creativity. On the other hand, characters could be
denied copyright protection altogether, apart from that granted to the original work. In this case
an author can slave for months developing a really memorable character that will bring joy to
generations of readers only to have that character copied and placed in any story the copier
pleases. Such a treatment may prove to offer too little incentive for the original author to exert
the amount of effort needed in order to create extraordinary characters.
It becomes clear that there is a need for balancing between giving the author enough
incentive to keep creating remarkable characters and leaving enough raw materials in the public
domain for new authors to build on. Courts have tried to come up with tests for when a character
deserves independent copyright protection keeping in mind the need for balancing, but there is
still much uncertainty when it comes to protection of literary characters.
Part II of this paper will offer a discussion of the characteristics of literary characters
which make them especially difficult to protect. Part III will describe historical treatment of
literary characters and the two main tests used to determine if they deserve independent
protection. Part IV will demonstrate that the two tests currently used are not an adequate tool for
determining when protection applies. The possibility of using trademark and unfair competition
laws to offer partial protection to fictional characters will be explored in part V. Part VI will
present an argument that literary characters do not need independent protection because they are
already sufficiently protected by copyright in the original work when supplemented by protection
offered from trademark and unfair competition laws. Also Part VI will argue that the tests
created for protection of fictional characters do not add anything different or valuable to the
determination of when characters should be protected that cannot already be found in the
substantial similarity test. Part VII will offer a conclusion.
3

II.

Why Are Literary Characters So Difficult To Protect?
Literary characters are especially hard to protect because they have a “tangible existence

only in specific words, pictures, and sounds created by [their] author.”12 Each reader uses these
descriptions to come up with a different mental image of the character. Different readers will
interpret the author’s description of a character differently; they will fill in the gaps left by the
author in various ways and will choose to judge and presume things about the character based on
their own individual set of values. “An independent character, therefore, is difficult to define or
grasp clearly, since no two minds will conceive of it in precisely the same way.”13
Defining a character is also difficult because authors, or good authors at least, do not
simply list all of the characteristics of their fictional characters at the beginning of a work. A
character develops throughout the book, through interactions with others, as well as through
accomplishments, failures and reactions to difficult situations. Because descriptions of
characters are often scattered throughout a work and continuously changing and building, it is
very difficult to grasp and clearly define who a character is.
Protecting a literary character independently poses a more difficult problem than
protecting a literary work as a whole. While neither is easy, at least a work has a beginning,
middle and end that can be compared to another work. Furthermore, a work has a plot that
follows a specific sequence, a set of characters, a setting, and a mood: all elements that can be
compared. The description of a character, on the other hand, is scattered throughout the book
and the mental image of the character is continuously changing and being developed in the
reader’s mind as the story unfolds. So when it comes time to compare two characters to see if
one substantially infringes another, it is difficult to put into words exactly what you are trying to
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protect (the mental image of this character). When one cannot clearly define or limit a character
a comparison with a potentially infringing character is especially difficult.
Graphic characters, on the other hand, do not suffer from the same elusiveness of other
non-graphically depicted literary characters and have therefore received different treatment. A
long line of cases has found that cartoon characters are protected by copyright even when
elements of plot are not copied.14 Graphic characters are not treated differently because they are
more deserving of protection, but rather because “it is far simpler to make visual comparisons
than to compare abstractions.”15
III.

Historical Treatment of Literary Characters
Despite the difficulty inherent in providing independent legal protection for literary

characters courts have articulated two main tests for when a character deserves independent
copyright protection. The first test was termed the “distinctively delineated” test and the second
test has been referred to as the “story being told” test.
The possibility of protecting literary characters seems to have had its origin in Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corporation.16 The plaintiff was the author of the play Abie’s Irish Rose
about a Jewish boy marrying an Irish-Catholic girl.17 The play follows the conflict the couples’
union causes within their religious families but ultimately has a happy ending. The plaintiff
alleges that the defendant’s motion picture The Cohen’s and The Kelleys infringed upon her
play.18 The defendant’s movie is about a Jewish girl and an Irish-Catholic man who marry and
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the trouble their marriage causes within their families.19 The movie also ends happily with the
families reconciling.
In the course of his decision Judge Hand mentioned the possibility that characters could
be protected “independently of the ‘plot’” even though such a case had not previously arisen.20
He explained that “[i]f Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that a second comer
might so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as to infringe, but it would not be enough
that for one of his characters he cast a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the
household, or a vain and foppish steward who became amorous of his mistress. These would be
no more than Shakespeare’s ‘ideas’ in the play, as little capable of monopoly as Einstein’s
Doctrine of Relativity, or Darwin’s theory of the Origin of Species. It follows that the less
developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear
for marking them too indistinctly.”21 This analysis by Judge Hand gave rise to the “distinct
delineation” test.
The distinct delineation test rests on the principle that the more developed a character is
the more he embodies protectable expression and less a general idea. A two part test has
developed from Judge Hand’s discussion and has become the standard to use in character
infringement cases.22 The first question is “whether the character was created with enough
delineation to afford copyright protection.”23 Only if the character is sufficiently developed to
constitute more then just an idea and therefore be worthy of copyright protection should one
move on to the second question. The second question is whether “the alleged infringer copied
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that character’s physical, emotional, or mental traits, or created a character based on a broader,
more abstract outline.”24 To establish an infringement there must be actual copying of
expression rather than copying of ideas or a general type of character.
The Ninth Circuit came up with the second major standard for determining whether
characters deserve independent copyright protection in Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System.25 In that case an author, Hammett, composed a mystery detective story
called the Maltese Falcon which had as its main character a detective named Sam Spade.26
Hammett then granted Warner Brothers exclusive rights in the Maltese Falcon writings to be
used in movies, radio and television.27 Hammett later used Sam Spade as the main character in
new stories he wrote and Warner Brothers complained that it had acquired the exclusive right to
the use of the writing, the Maltese Falcon.28 Warner argued that the license included the
individual characters, their names and the title.29 The author argued that the exclusive use of the
characters and their names were not granted in the license and that he could therefore use them in
subsequent stories.30
The Court held that rights to the characters were not granted in the license to Warner and
that Hammett could use the character in a subsequent story. The Court explained that the
argument set forth by Warner was “unreasonable, and would effect the very opposite of the
statute’s purpose which is to encourage the production of the arts.”31 The Court went on to
reason, however, that “[i]t is conceivable that the character really constitutes the story being told,
but if the character is only a chessman in the game of telling the story he is not within the area of
24
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the protection afforded by the copyright.”32 The Court concluded that even if Hammett had
assigned the complete rights to Warner he could still use his characters in subsequent stories
because “[t]he characters were vehicles for the story told, and the vehicles did not go with the
sale of the story.”33
The story being told test greatly narrowed the protection available for literary
characters.34 In fact, the standard excluded “virtually any character from copyright protection,
because it ‘seems to envisage a ‘story’ devoid of plot wherein character study constitutes all, or
substantially all, of the work.”35 The standard has been criticized and many courts have declined
to use it, have distorted what it said to avoid its consequences, or have ignored it and applied the
Nichols test instead.36 Despite the stringent standard, certain characters such as Rocky and
James Bond have been found to constitute the story being told.37 In both these cases, however,
the court also included an analysis under the “distinctly delineated” standard.
If the two main standards used to determine when literary characters are entitled to
copyright protection seem vague and confusing it is because they are. The following section
outlines some of the problems with both the “distinctly delineated” and the “story being told”
standard.
IV.

The “Distinctly Delineated” and “Story Being Told” Standard Are Not Helpful
When It Comes To Deciding Which Characters To Protect.
The “distinctively delineated” standard is difficult to apply for three main reasons. The

test is vague and asks judges to assume the roles of literary critics, it is often applied wrongly
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leading to overprotection, and it does not necessarily protect the most developed characters.38
The distinctively delineated test makes it clear that the more developed a character is the more
protection he deserves. However, beyond that the test does not give much guidance. What
exactly makes a character distinctly delineated enough to warrant protection has not been
explained. Judges are left to act as literary critics and decide on their own which fictional
characters deserve protection and which lack sufficient development. “What makes a fictional
character worthy of protection seems to require Justice Stewart’s ‘I know it when I see it’ test.”39
The problem with trying to clearly articulate why a certain character is distinctly
delineated is demonstrated well by the court’s efforts in Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer.40
The court held that Tarzan was distinctively delineated and sufficiently developed so as to be
copyrightable. The court’s description of Tarzan, however, does not convey in the least why the
character is developed or distinctively delineated. The court’s description was as follows:
“Tarzan is the ape-man. He is an individual closely in tune with his jungle environment, able to
communicate with animals yet able to experience human emotion. He is athletic, innocent,
youthful, gentle and strong. He is Tarzan.”41 The description seems more of a general character
type and can apply equally well to Kipling’s Mowgli.42
The case could be used to demonstrate that a comparison of the two works would offer a
more convincing and less arbitrary argument for why Tarzan should be protected, except that the
judge in that case had nothing to compare. Unfortunately, the issue in that case was not
infringement, but whether a grant of the right to use the character arose under copyright.43 The
court had to determine if Tarzan was sufficiently delineated to be copyrightable in order to
38
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determine whether a grant of a nonexclusive license to use the character of Tarzan was a right
under copyright, and therefore subject to the termination provisions of the Copyright Act.44
The case is still illustrative of the difficulty in trying to fit characters into a category such
as developed on one hand or not sufficiently developed on the other hand. “Attempting to
determine the extent of a character’s development, without making comparisons, leads to
abstract and fruitless speculation.”45 Inevitably a description of a character meant to demonstrate
why he is distinctly delineated ends up reading like a description of a general type and “covers
the pattern of many characters.”46 These inherent problems with attempting to designate a
character “distinctly delineated” or “well developed” lead to the conclusion that this is not a
helpful or proper test for determining when to offer independent protection to literary characters.
Perhaps, because of the lack of guidance courts have begun overprotecting characters by
considering whether they are copyrightable rather than whether there has been infringement.
These courts seem to be concentrating on the first part of the Nichols test by determining whether
a character is sufficiently delineated and then automatically finding infringement without
performing a comparison of the two works in order to determine whether enough has been taken
to constitute infringement. For instance, in a case involving Tarzan the court found that
defendant’s adult movie entitled Tarz & Jane & Boy & Cheeta infringed upon plaintiff’s literary
work.47 The court explained that the characters were distinctly delineated and then
automatically, without further analysis, found defendant’s characters to be substantially similar
and therefore infringing.48
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Another example of a court concentrating on the copyrightability of a character is seen in
a case dealing with Hopalong Cassidy.49 The character of Cassidy as portrayed in the book was
tough, confrontational, prone to violence, cursing, and tobacco-chewing.50 The character of
Cassidy in the movie was cleaned up quite a bit and appeared kind and sentimental, and did not
curse.51
Despite this lack of similarity between the two characters the court held that Hopalong
Cassidy in the book was distinctly delineated and that using his character would be copyright
infringement “irrespective and independent of the similarity of the story line.”52 The court held
that Cassidy from the motion picture was “substantially similar to the character ‘Hopalong
Cassidy’ in the books, and [that] both characters exhibit the same basic traits.”53 “As to the
demonstrable fact that not the least similarity beyond name and cowboy background existed
between the character Mulford [the author] created and the character portrayed by William Boyd
in the movies, [Judge] Werker simply described the movie Cassidy as Mulford’s Cassidy “turned
inside out.”54
It is evident from these cases that courts have sometimes turned to determining whether a
character is copyrightable or distinctly developed without comparing the original and allegedly
infringing characters. “Explicitly or implicitly, some courts have used the ‘magically expedient’
phrase of ‘well developed’ to arrive [at and] solidify their reasoning.”55 The magic words “well
developed” or “distinctly delineated”, however, do not tell us anything about whether the two
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works or characters are substantially similar or if enough was taken to constitute copyright
infringement.
Apart from being employed in a way that is susceptible to overprotection of characters
based on a pronouncement of the magic words “well developed”, the “distinctly delineated” test
is also flawed because it does not necessarily offer protection for the most developed of
characters. In fact, “[t]he most well-rounded characters, those that are the most fully human,
may be the most inextricably bound to their context.”56 It is questionable whether a reader
would be able to recognize the character of Raskolnikov in a new story despite the fact that
Crime and Punishment centers on the characters interior conflict, thoughts, feelings of alienation
and self loathing to a degree that makes Raskolnikov seem very real.57 Instead, the “flatter
character”, the one that does not change through experiences but is always consistent, is the
character that is the most recognizable when removed from the original work.58
Sherlock Holmes has been described as a very limited and predictable character, almost
formulaic.59 Doyle had grown tired of Holmes “because his character admits of no light or
shade.”60 However, Sherlock Holmes is one of those characters that would be considered well
developed and offered protection. “A more rounded character, however, is remembered in
connection with the scene ‘through which she passed and as modified by these scenes – that is to
say, we do not remember her so easily because she waxes and wanes and has facets like a human
being.’”61
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Because it is so difficult to determine which characters are developed enough to deserve
protection it seems that a test allowing judges to reach decisions based on the magic words “well
developed” is not a desirable solution. “There is no reason to credit judges with the ability to
function as literary or artistic critics of last resort.”62 While the distinctively delineated test was
initially developed to include a determination of whether there is substantial similarity between
the two characters, courts have been selectively ignoring this second part of the Nichols test.
All of the criticisms of the distinctively delineated test apply equally well to the “story
being told” test. The “story being told test” offers us a distinction between a character who
“constitutes the story being told” and one that is “only the chessman in the game of telling the
story.”63 However, “[w]hat this distinction is suppose to mean, how any court could conceivably
use it to divide protected from unprotected characters, and what gives a federal judge the
aesthetic credentials to draw this line, are matters on which Judge Stephens maintains a
sphinxlike silence.”64 The result is that the test is applied inconsistently, not at all or in
combination with the distinctively delineated test.65 Either way the results are unpredictable and
confusing.
V.

Trademark and Unfair Competition
As explained above the tests for determining protection under copyright law are

confusing, difficult to apply and often yield unpredictable results. The difficult application of the
“distinctly delineated” and “story being told” test has led legal scholars to examine alternate
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grounds for offering protection to literary characters. Trademark and unfair competition seem to
be the primary alternatives to copyright.66 “Where the concept of copyright is intended to protect
the creative expression existing within a character, trademark and unfair competition laws are
concerned with a character’s capacity to symbolize a particular source of goods or services.”67
The critical issue is whether the alleged infringer’s use of character is likely to cause public
confusion regardless of whether protection is sought under state laws of unfair competition or the
federal trademark statute.68 Unfair competition encompasses the narrower law of
trademark,69which protects against “any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representations of fact” that are likely to “cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to origin…”70
Two questions must be answered to determine if infringement has taken place.71 The
first is whether the character has achieved “secondary meaning” or rather “does the public
associate the character’s name with the particular product being sold?”72 The second question is
whether there is a likelihood of confusion or “is the use of the character’s name by another likely
to deceive and confuse the public as to the source of the goods?”73
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There are several advantages to trademark and unfair competition protection over
copyright protection for literary characters. For one thing, trademark and unfair competition
offer protection of the name, appearance, costumes, and key phrases of a character, all things left
unprotected by copyright.74 Another significant advantage is that “the fact that a copyrightable
character or design has fallen into the public domain should not preclude protection under the
trademark laws so long as it is shown to have acquired independent trademark significance…”75
Therefore, trademark and unfair competition protection may extend well beyond the copyright
term as long as the character keeps his secondary meaning and there is a likelihood of public
confusion.
Unfair competition and trademark laws have been used to protect various aspects of
fictional characters. In an early case the name and appearance of Charlie Chaplin were
protected.76 The defendant was featured in films dressed and acting like “Charlie Chaplin” but
under the name “Charlie Aplin”.77 The court found that the defendants wanted to deceive the
public into believing they were paying to see Charlie Chaplin so as to secure a larger audience
and therefore enjoined the defendants from further imitating the plaintiff.78 In another case a
defendant was enjoined from using the name “Frank Merriwell” under the law of unfair
competition, even though none of the plaintiff’s stories were copied.79 The court found that the
name “has become descriptive, and is closely identified in the public mind with the work of a
particular author” so as to mislead the public.80
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A character’s name was also protected in a case where a radio host known as the Old
Maestro advertised plaintiff’s beer and malt beverages.81 The defendant started using the name
Old Maestro Brew for its own beer.82 The court found that the radio audience knew that the Old
Maestro’s radio show was sponsored by the plaintiff and associated the name with the plaintiff’s
products as well as the radio host.83 The court therefore enjoined the defendant from using the
name because it was likely to cause confusion.84
Similarly, Tarzan’s name was protected in a case where the defendant advertised an Xrated film by the name Tarz & Jane & Boy & Cheeta.85 The court held that the public could be
misled about the source or origin of the film and mistakenly think it was authorized or provided
by the plaintiff.86
The appearance and costumes of characters have also been protected under trademark and
unfair competition laws. In a case where the plaintiff owned the copyrights and trademarks
relating to the characters Superman and Wonder Woman the defendant was enjoined from using
similar characters in his business.87 The defendant operated a singing telegram company that
featured characters named Superstud and Wonderwench who were dressed in costumes similar to
the originals and carried balloons depicting Superman and Wonder Woman.88 The court found
the public was likely to be confused as to the source and sponsorship of the singing telegram
service.89 The court also found the defendant was benefiting from the good will created by the
plaintiff’s mark.90
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Despite the numerous ways in which trademark and unfair competition have been used to
protect elements of fictional characters there are disadvantages to this protection as well. In
order to receive protection a character must acquire “secondary meaning”, the public must
identify the character with a single source, and there must be a likelihood of public confusion.91
The requirement that a character acquire “secondary meaning” leaves new, unsuccessful
or simply less well known literary characters unprotected.92 The only characters that receive
protection under trademark and unfair competition law are ones that are known to the public and
have “undergone some reasonable degree of circulation.”93
For instance, the names Ziggy94 and Melvin the Monster95 were not protected under
trademark and unfair competition even though the defendants used identical names in their work.
The characters were not known to the public, they had almost no circulation, so that nobody
associated them with a particular source and there was little likelihood of confusion.96
Similarly, the character of Paladin was not extended protection because he was not
widely known and therefore could not have acquired secondary meaning.97 The plaintiff, De
Costa, made public appearances at rodeos where he entertained children dressed up in a cowboy
costume and pretended to be a character named Paladin.98 He carried with him a business card
that had the phrases “Have Gun Will Travel, Wire Paladin, N. Court St., Cranston, R.I.” on it and
was inscribed with a chess knight.99 He wore all black and had St. Mary’s medal affixed to his
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hat.100 The plaintiff dressed up in the character of Paladin purely to entertain people.101 Years
after the plaintiff began appearing as Paladin defendants came out with a television show that
copied the appearance of Paladin, his name, and had the phrase “Have Gun, Will Travel, Wire
Paladin, San Francisco” on his card.102 The court acknowledged that the defendants had copied,
but found there was no likelihood of confusion as to the source of the tv show.103 The original
Paladin was therefore denied relief despite the high degree of copying. The only thing that was
relevant to the analysis was that there was no likelihood of public confusion.
Even characters that are well known may not be protected if they are associated with
more then one source. In order, to obtain protection a literary character must be associated with
a single source.104 Association with a single source, in many cases, is a “convenient fiction” for
literary characters, since they have been associated with their authors105, producers106,
sponsors107, and even with themselves108.109
For instance, the character of King Kong was denied protection under trademark or unfair
competition because he was not associated with a single source in the public mind.110 Universal
sued Nintendo alleging that its game “Donkey Kong” infringed Universal’s trademark in King
Kong.111 The rights in King Kong were divided between RKO, which owned rights in the first

100

Id.
Id. at 511.
102
Id. at 509.
103
Id. at 515.
104
Kurtz, supra note 68, at 442.
105
Gruelle v. Molly – ‘Es Doll Outfitters, 94 F.2d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 561 (1938); Patten
v. Superior Talking Pictures, Inc., 8 F. Supp., 196, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, 433, 132
N.E. 133, 139, cert. denied, 257 U.S. 654 (1921).
106
Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1982); Wyatt Earp Enters. V.
Sackman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
107
Premier Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 761 (D. Conn. 1935).
108
DC Comics v. Unlimited Monkey Business, 598 F. Supp. 110, 115 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
109
Kurtz, supra note 12, at 485.
110
Universal City Studios v. Nintendo Co., 578 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d 746 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1984).
111
Id. at 913.
101

18

King Kong movie, DDL which owned the rights in a 1976 remake, Cooper, the son of the author,
who owned rights in the book and Universal which obtained its rights from Cooper.112
The court explained that “[e]xactly what shred of the King Kong character and name
Universal owns is far from clear” and that the “vagueness of the image in which Universal
claims a trademark right violates the fundamental purpose of trademark: to identify the source of
a product and thereby prevent consumer confusion as to that source.”113 Therefore, the court
found that because of the extensive merchandising and “the competing property interests in King
Kong”, the character “no longer signifies a single source of origin to consumers and thus is not a
valid trademark.114
Similarly, in Frederick Warner & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., the plaintiff was the publisher
of the Peter Rabbit books written and illustrated by Beatrix Potter.115 The plaintiff sued the
defendant for trademark infringement of the illustrations of Peter Rabbit.116 The defendant had
used a few of the illustrations in his own book about Peter Rabbit. Plaintiff claimed that while a
number of volumes were no longer protected by copyright, the illustrations had acquired a
secondary meaning and identified the publishing company.117 The court found that “it would not
be enough that the illustrations in question have come to signify Beatrix Potter as author of the
books; plaintiff must show that they have come to represent its goodwill and reputation as
Publisher of those books.”118 Therefore, before a party can seek protection through trademark or
unfair protection laws it must be sure that the character is associated with one source and that
source is the plaintiff himself.
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Trademark and unfair competition are also unavailable as a means of protection if there is
little likelihood of public confusion. To be confused the public does not need to be tricked into
buying something because they believe it is something different.119 It is enough if the public
believes a single source approved the new work, is in some way associated or connected with the
new work or sponsored it.120 The public may not even “be aware of the name of the source” as
long as “they assume that products bearing the mark come from a single, though anonymous
source.”121 This is important in the movie industry because most people cannot identify a
specific movie with a producing company, but they recognize that there is a single source.122
The King Kong case discussed above is a good example of a case where the court held
the characters were not similar enough for the public to be confused as to source or
association.123 The court found that even if King Kong possessed a secondary meaning
associated with Universal there would still remain the question of whether consumers were likely
to confuse Donkey Kong and King Kong.124 The court explained that Universal must show that
“there exists a likelihood that an appreciable number of ordinary prudent purchasers will be
misled, or simply confused, as to the source of the goods in question.”125
After a comparison of the two characters the court found that Donkey Kong and his
environment “create a totally different concept and feel” and that “at best, Donkey Kong is a
parody of King Kong.”126 While King Kong “fights with dinosaurs, giant snakes, airplanes and
helicopters” and dies a “tragic and bloody death”, Donkey Kong’s obstacles include “pies,
119
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cement tubs, birthday cakes, and umbrellas.”127 The video game character, Donkey Kong, was
described as “farcical”, “childlike”, “nonsexual”, “comical” and therefore much different then
the “ferocious” King Kong who goes on “rampages, chases people, crushes them underfoot, and
throws them to the ground.”128 The court held that even if King Kong possessed a secondary
meaning associated with Universal there was no likelihood of confusion and granted defendant
summary judgment.129
Trademark and unfair competition laws can offer protection of the author’s good will and
give the author a say in how his character will be used even if the character is not copied enough
for a finding of copyright infringement.130 However, in many ways the scope of protection
offered by trademark is far more limited than copyright protection. Whereas copyright
protection requires a showing of access and substantial similarity, trademark and unfair
competition require a showing of secondary meaning, association with a single source, and
likelihood of public confusion. As evidenced by the cases discussed above any of these three
requirements can make it difficult to retain control through trademark or unfair competition laws.
VI.

Do We Even Need A Separate Test For Characters?
In examining the protection available for fictional characters two points become clear.

One is that the “distinctly delineated” and “story being told” tests are generally unhelpful
because they are vague and offer little guidance as to when a character is infringed upon.
Second, when the tests are applied in a helpful manner they essentially reiterate the substantial
similarity test and do not offer anything new to the analysis. Since the unhelpful parts are best
ignored and the helpful parts are already included in the substantial similarity test there is no
need for separate tests for literary characters and they should not be used.
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As mentioned in the introduction there is a need for a balance between giving authors the
chance to profit from and control the use of their characters and the need to leave enough
building blocks in the public domain for new authors. After reviewing the current state of
copyright, trademark and unfair competition laws as applied to literary characters it appears the
proper balance would be reached if a character was protected within the original work in which it
appeared and also by trademark and unfair competition laws. Separate protection for literary
characters would not offer authors any additional incentive to create and would remove too much
from the public domain.
A. Protection Within The Original Work Using The Substantial Similarity Test
Literary characters should receive copyright protection, but only because a substantial
copying of a character may infringe the original copyrighted work in which the character
appears, not because fictional characters deserve independent protection. There have been a
variety of tests designed to determine when one work is substantially similar to another.
The first step in the analysis should be to separate ideas from expression. As applied to
characters this first step would involve deciding whether the character is just a general type, an
idea, or whether there is enough expression to be protectable. This analysis is precisely what
some courts have been doing as part of the “distinctly delineated” or “well developed” test. The
first step, however, does not deserve a separate name since it has always been part of the
substantial similarity test. It is a basic principle of copyright law that in order to find copyright
infringement one must “determine whether there has been copying of the expression of an idea
rather than just the idea itself.”131 The determination by itself is only useful in eliminating those
characters who are so clearly a general type and not worthy of protection that a full analysis
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would be a waste of time. This step does not help us with characters that are more then a general
type, and for these more expressive characters a comparison is needed.
The two-part, extrinsic/intrinsic test articulated in Krofft will work well in determining
whether a character is protected by copyright within the context of the original work.132 The
“extrinsic test” compares “specific, objective criteria of two works on the basis of an analytic
dissection of the following elements of each work –plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace,
characters, and sequence of events.”133 The outcome of the extrinsic test “may often be decided
as a matter of law.”134
The second part of the Krofft analysis “requires that the trier of fact then decide whether
there is substantial similarity in the expressions of the ideas so as to constitute infringement.”135
This “intrinsic” part asks whether the “total concept and feel” of the two works is substantially
similar.136 The intrinsic test relies on the observations of the “ordinary reasonable person.”137
The Krofft test permits a finding of infringement only if both the extrinsic and intrinsic test are
satisfied.138
The amount of protection offered to a character within the original work in which it
appears is sufficient because it is extremely hard to completely separate a character from
“trailing elements of plot”.139 All characters are bound by their time, place, history, experiences,
and relationships with other characters.140 Professor Kurtz gives the example of placing Tarzan
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in New York city for a new story.141 Even though Tarzan is in a completely new setting and
involved in a different story he would not be Tarzan if “he was not previously raised by apes”, if
he did not grow up in the jungle, and if he was not good with animals.142 Therefore, if one is to
copy a character and capture who that character is in a substantially similar way, it is almost
impossible not to copy elements of the original work.
If the new author included a description of Tarzan’s history, the jungle where Tarzan
grew up, his relationships with the animals, and the development of his various skills these
descriptions would most likely be enough to constitute substantial similarity with the original
work thereby offering protection for Tarzan’s character. On the other hand if the second author
copies only the idea of a man growing up with animals, but produces a very different character,
the intrinsic part of the test would act as a check to overprotection. Therefore, if the New York
Tarzan had a vastly different “concept and feel” about him there would be no infringement since
the intrinsic part of the test would not be satisfied. So far the Krofft test is accomplishing
precisely what it is supposed to: it is protecting the expression of ideas but not the ideas
themselves.
One possible problem occurs when the new author uses only the name Tarzan, relying on
the character’s popularity to conjure up in the consumer’s minds a mental image of who the
character is. Copyright law cannot protect a character’s name and would offer no relief. The
new author would not have to include a description of Tarzan’s history, relationships, jungle
origins, or special skills in order to convey to the reader who Tarzan is. Everyone already knows
who Tarzan is. Therefore, there may not be enough substantial similarity of expression between
the original and new work to constitute infringement. However, the name of the character, his
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dress, a famous phrase the character utters, or anything that conjures up the mental image of the
character can most likely be protected by trademark and unfair competition laws.
B. Trademark and Unfair Competition To Supplement Copyright In Original Work
As described in the cases mentioned earlier, trademark and unfair competition laws can
protect a character’s name, appearance, and catch phrase.143 Therefore, trademark and unfair
competition laws would offer the original author protection if a new author started writing stories
about Tarzan. What about the additional requirements of trademark law, the need for a finding
of secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion?
If the character is one that has not acquired secondary meaning then there is no trademark
protection, but the same concerns or compelling reasons to offer protection are also not present.
Since the character does not have secondary meaning, the character is most likely not well
known and will not automatically create a mental image in a reader’s mind. Therefore, the new
author will either have to copy the original author’s expression that created the character, in
which case copyright will offer relief, or else come up with his own description of the character
in which case there will be no substantial copying.
If the character is well known or has secondary meaning, the courts are very likely to find
likelihood of confusion. When Tarzan’s name was used in the title of an X-rated movie the court
found the use likely to cause confusion as to source or origin.144 Furthermore, the court found
that a disclaimer, which explained the movie was in no way associated with the plaintiff, was not
enough to prevent the confusion and ordered the defendant to stop using the name.145 It is clear
from this example that authors can gain substantial protection for their literary characters through
trademark and that potential infringers will not be able to get away with copying by simply
143
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including a disclaimer. In fact trademark seems to overprotect characters since it is unlikely the
public would think Edgar Rice Burroughs, after writing some twenty six novels about Tarzan,
decided to venture in to the adult movie industry.
C. Protection Within The Original Work Through The Krofft Test Together With
Trademark and Unfair Competition Laws As Applied To The Cases.
In many character infringement cases when two works are compared they are often
described in a limited fashion so that a full analysis of plot, mood, setting, dialogue and the
various other elements is difficult to accomplish. For instance, in Burroughs v. Manns Theatres,
the defendant’s X-rated film Tarz & Jane & Boy & Cheeta was found to utilize characters which
were substantially similar to those contained in the plaintiff’s copyrighted works.146 The court
did not include a comparison of the two works, but simply found that “characters which are
distinctly delineated in copyrighted works are protected by the copyright in those works” and
that the advertising and distribution of defendants movie would infringe on the plaintiff’s
copyright in the literary works.147
There are certain things that can be easily presumed about an X-rated movie without the
benefit of a court description or personal familiarity so that a comparison can be carried out
despite the lack of information. The first step of the test is whether the character of Tarzan in the
original work is merely a stock character or whether he contains enough expression to be
copyrightable. This standard is set relatively low since it is meant to eliminate those characters
that are clearly a general type. Tarzan has been the main character of twenty-six novels in the
course of which his childhood, history, relationships, characteristics and skills have been
outlined in detail. It is therefore safe to assume that Tarzan is more then an idea and is composed
of expression.
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The analysis of why Tarzan is more than just an idea is not any more articulate then the
description of why Tarzan is “well-developed” offered in Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
and criticized earlier in the paper. However, the reason the description in Burroughs was
criticized is because that was the entirety of the test used to determine whether a character was
copyrightable. The case was used to illustrate the problem of fitting a character in to a category,
well-developed vs. not well-developed and then using this determination to find infringement.148
In contrast, the test proposed here treats the question of whether a character is more than an idea
as only the first step in a longer analysis and is meant only to eliminate those characters that are
clearly a general type. The proposed test recognizes that the idea/expression dichotomy is
difficult to articulate and that it cannot be the sole basis of a test, but that it is useful in
eliminating characters who are purely ideas and therefore not protectable by copyright.
Next, the two-part, extrinsic/intrinsic test articulated in Krofft is applied.149 The extrinsic
test calls for a comparison of plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters and sequence
of events.150 It is doubtful that the movie stays true to the plot of any of the Tarzan literary
works or attempts to follow the same sequence of events. What is more likely is that the movie
borrows the general idea of a man rescuing a woman in the jungle and than adds numerous
events and acts not present in the original works. The theme and mood, considering the different
purposes and audiences, are likely different. It is fair to assume that the movie did not borrow
the literary works dialogue in its entirety or at all and instead substituted its own dialogue.
Similarly, while the literary works describe in detail the beauty and wilderness of the jungle, the
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movie may use this setting in a minimal way. Finally, an X-rated movie is not likely to focus on
developing the characters so that no more than the idea of Tarzan was likely taken.
Since, the extrinsic test would undoubtedly fail there is no need to move on to the
intrinsic part of the test. However, in the event that “Tarz & Jane & Boy & Cheeta” is a movie
that closely follows the literary works as far as sequence of events, dialogue, theme, and takes
time to develop the characters, the intrinsic test will be applied. The intrinsic test calls for the
trier of fact to determine whether the two works have a substantially similar “total concept and
feel.” Again, taking into consideration the vastly different purposes of the two works and the
non-sexual nature of the literary work as opposed to the highly sexualized nature of the movie,
the two works would likely have a drastically different concept and feel.
Under the proposed test, therefore, the defendant’s X-rated movie would not infringe
upon the plaintiff’s copyright. However, the name Tarzan would be protected under trademark
and unfair competition, and in fact was protected in the actual case as described earlier. The
court went too far, however, when if found that the movie infringed the plaintiff’s copyright
since the defendant cannot even remedy the problem by changing the title and character names.
If the test proposed in this paper was used then the defendant would still have to change the
names in the movie, but would be able to distribute it once there was no likelihood of confusion
because the two works are not substantially similar and should not be protected by copyright.
The desirability of allowing the defendant to distribute his film, once he no longer
infringed plaintiff’s trademark, may escape some readers, but the principal of balancing between
authors rights and what is left in the public domain must apply equally to all sorts of works.
Next time a set of characters is found to be distinctly delineated and a work automatically
deemed infringing, the second work could be one of great artistic value. Even in this case, the
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creativity of the defendant’s work may offer raw material and building blocks to others within
the movie industry, as well as enrich the lives of a certain segment of the public.
The proposed test would also yield better results in the Hopalong Cassidy case.151 The
court in that case found that the character of Cassidy and a few others from the book “were
sufficiently delineated, developed and well known to the public to be copyrightable. The use of
these characters for the purposes intended by Filmvideo therefore would constitute infringement
with respect to the above numbered films irrespective and independent of the similarity of the
story line.”152 Despite reading the books and viewing the movies the court could only explain
the similarity in character as the movie Cassidy being “Cassidy turned inside out.”153 Other
similarities the court noted included names of characters, names of towns, and the same general
setting.154 As previously described the two characters did not seem especially similar apart from
sharing a name and a western setting so the Krofft test will be applied to determine whether
Filmvideo should have been enjoined from using the 23 movies they developed.
Hopalong Cassidy has been described in detail in twenty six novels and is therefore likely
to be more than a simple stock character. Since Cassidy likely encompasses protectable
expression the next step is to apply the extrinsic test. Rather then view the twenty three movies
and read the twenty six novels I will rely on the courts descriptions as well as the description
provided by an expert witness for Filmvideo.155
The Court found that eleven of the movies infringed the books copyrights because there
was substantial similarity of storyline.156 For the rest of the movies, however, the Court did not
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find substantial similarity of storyline, but found that the use of the Hopalong Cassidy characters
alone would constitute copyright infringement irrespective of the plot. Therefore, for those
remaining twelve movies there is no substantial similarity in plot, dialogue, or sequence of
events since these can all be said to constitute the storyline.
The setting, theme, mood and pace of the movies and the books are most likely similar.
The setting of both is the Old West and the theme is one of action and adventure. The mood is
light hearted and both the books and movies are quick paced. However, the Old West and the
types of locales that existed in that time as well as the “genre of action-adventure” are precluded
from copyright protection by the “scenes a faire” exception.157 Included under the “scenes a
faire” exception are “incidents, characters, or settings which are indispensable, or at least
standard, in the treatment of a given topic.”158
The Ninth Circuit has held that when two works both emphasize action and adventure
and therefore share the same general theme, mood and pace than “those similarities that do exist
ar[i]se from unprotectable scenes a faire, [and] there exists no substantial similarity of
protectable expression.”159 Likewise, in the Cassidy case the similarity that does exists is not
similarity of protectable expression, but rather of general elements without which an actionadventure movie set in the Old West would not be possible.
The court in the Cassidy case also noted that the names of some of the characters and
towns were taken from the books and included in the movies. The name of a town or character
157
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cannot be protected under copyright laws160, but use of a characters name can be used as one
factor in determining whether the development of a character was copied.161 “If the character’s
development [was] not copied, however, using the name is not a basis for finding copyright
infringement.”162
Therefore, the analysis leads us to a comparison of Cassidy as described in the books and
Cassidy as portrayed in the movies. The book Cassidy is described as “a falmouthed, tobaccospitting, violence-prone young tough, who… is involved in countless battles, chases, and
confrontations…[He] grows into a hard-bitten, middle-aged gunman and sometimes peace
officer...”163 The movie Cassidy avoids alcohol, does not swear, rides on a white horse, is kind
and sentimental and is so “sanitized from Mulford’s [the authors] conception of the character that
Mulford made constant complaints to the film-makers who generally responded . . . by ignoring
his diatribes and sending him a box of cigars.”164 Therefore, the cleaned up movie version of
Cassidy is not substantially similar to the rough version of Cassidy described in the books.
At least twelve of the movies followed their own storylines, dialogue, sequence of events
and had vastly different main characters. The movies have a similar theme, pace and mood as
the book, but these are “scenes a faire” without which the specific genre of Old West adventure
movies or books could not be produced. Therefore, according to the extrinsic part of the Krofft
test the two works are not substantially similar.
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Next the intrinsic test would be left to the jury to decide whether the book and movie
version have the same “total concept and feel”. The story line was already determined by the
court to be different, the theme, mood, and pace are common to many western adventure stories
so the only element that could give the movies the same feel as the book are the characters. It is
doubtful that a jury would have recognized Cassidy in his “inside out” form. It is also doubtful
that the jury would have attributed the many differences between the two characters to the
movie’s exposure to the public of the “kind, sentimental, thinking person” hidden from public
view in the book Cassidy. What is more likely is that the different storylines and different
characters would have created a different “total concept and feel.”
Therefore, under the proposed test at least twelve of the movies would not be found to
infringe, but the plaintiff would still be able to protect Hopalong Cassidy’s name under
trademark and unfair competition laws. The defendant would be forced to use different names
for the main character and public would get the benefit of twenty three movies. This result is
more desirable because it is closer to the purpose of copyright law which is to make as many
works available to the public as possible while leaving artists with enough incentive to create. A
movie that does not copy the names, storyline or characters from another work, but uses the same
“scenes a fair” is unlikely to offend artists to such an extent that they will loose incentive to
create.
The test proposed in this paper is not easy to administer. It requires reading, viewing or
listening to both the original work and the allegedly infringing work, which in some cases is no
simple task.165 Furthermore, the test requires a jury to consider the two works in order to
determine if they have the same concept and feel. On the other hand, the “distinctly delineated”
165

Despite reaching a decision that has since been criticized in many law review articles the judge in the Hopalong
Cassidy case read all 26 novels (8363 pages) and viewed 23 motion pictures (almost 27 hours of viewing);
Filmvideo, supra note 49, at 62.

32

and “story being told” test are fairly easy to administer. A judge can decide whether a character
is well-developed based on the number of works the character has appeared in or the popularity
of the character or a variety of other factors that do not involve dissecting and comparing various
elements of each work or letting a jury consider the matter.
The difference is that there is a much lower likelihood of error with the proposed test then
with either the “distinctly delineated” or the “story being told” test. The test proposed in this
paper is composed of several steps because it recognizes the difficulty in determining whether
two works are substantially similar and whether the alleged infringer has copied more then just
an idea. The test works well because it allows the court to compare various aspects of the two
works, step by step, but also examine the works as a whole and evaluate how the total work
appears to the ordinary observer. The test is complicated for a reason, it is designed to fairly and
accurately further the purpose of copyright law.
D. Appropriate Balance Achieved with Copyright In the Original Work
In recent years the balance between giving new authors enough incentive to create and
leaving enough building blocks in the public domain seems to have tilted against the public
domain.166 This trend of offering increasing amounts of protection for fictional characters may
have been influenced by the exceptional earning power of fictional characters. Fictional
characters are at the center of a multibillion-dollar industry offering strong motivation for owners
to fight to preserve their monopoly any way they can.
For instance, Forbes reported in a list of top ten earning fictional characters that Mickey
Mouse made $5.8 billion in 2003.167 Winnie the Pooh, born in 1926, made $5.6 billion in
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2003.168 Harry Potter, a new addition, made $2.8 billion, the same year.169 In fact, J.K.
Rowling, who was on welfare before she wrote the Harry Potter books, is now the first author to
qualify for a spot on Forbes’s billionaire list.170
The earnings of these characters are impressive, but they do not offer an argument for
why fictional characters deserve their own independent protection. After all, would J.K.
Rowling forgo writing the Harry Potter books if she knew she would “only” earn $10 million as
opposed to the $147 million she earned in 2003?171 Authors already have enough incentive to
create by virtue of their monopoly in the original work. In order for literary works to be
successful they must contain interesting and real characters and this will not change whether or
not the characters are offered independent protection. The bargain authors have struck with the
public is already more than fair so that offering characters independent protection will not make
more of the arts available to the public, but will only stifle further creativity.
VII.

Conclusion

Literary characters are protected within the copyright of the original work in which they
appear, but the law is less clear when a character is separated from the original work and leads an
independent life. The two main tests articulated by courts to deal with the phenomenon of an
independent character have not been particularly helpful. The tests are mainly used after a
decision has already been reached to give the decision additional validity by uttering the magic
words “distinctly delineated” or “story being told”.
A better alternative is to rely on the copyright protection in the original work since it will
be difficult to copy a character without copying a substantial amount of the original author’s
expression. The substantial similarity test is well suited for determining when so much has been
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taken from the original so as to constitute infringement. Furthermore, trademark and unfair
competition laws protect the character who is so well known that an infringer need only mention
the name without copying the expression.
Granting fictional characters independent protection would go against the purpose of
copyright law since it would limit creativity and the dissemination of new works to the public.
For years, authors have borrowed from each other and used these building blocks to create new
inspiring and enriching works. Offering independent protection to fictional characters would
limit the pool of raw material and would do a great disservice to the public. The main concern of
copyright law should be to promote the progress of the arts, not to secure an everlasting stream
of revenue for character owners.
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